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Has the executive role of the European Commission changed since 
the euro debt crisis? Intergovernmentalists point to the increased 
role of the member states and the Council at the expense of the 
Commission and other supranational institutions. This paper 
examines how the Commission has responded to the expansion of 
fiscal and economic rules such as the regulations that strengthen the 
EU’s statistical competence and the Six-Pack and Two-Pack. Based 
on interviews conducted with key staff, we find that these rules 
have created significant coordination, information, and analytical 
demands on the Commission. The latter has enhanced its horizontal 
and vertical coordination efforts, prioritized staff for the 
Directorate-Generals conducting surveillance activities, added DGs 
to these efforts, and reorganized their organizational structures to 
promote a deeper understanding of the member states’ fiscal and 
economic policies. Using a principal-agent approach this paper 
explains how the Commission has increased its role in European 
integration process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The euro debt crisis has drawn attention to the nature of governance in the European 
integration process. Many have pointed to the fact that it took the EU long to respond to the 
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crisis and that the usual institutional structures were insufficiently equipped to cope with the 
unfolding crisis. In order to settle their differences member states often relied on the 
European Council to make decisions to deal with the crisis of the day.  
 
Intergovernmentalists have emphasized that the euro debt crisis has brought to the fore that 
member states are in the driving seat. Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter (2015) speak about an 
‘integration paradox’, that is, although there is more European Union (EU) activity they do 
not observe a transfer to supranationalism. They argue that ‘The two key intergovernmental 
treaties following the crisis – the fiscal compact and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) Treaty – empower the Commission to a limited degree in one case and not at all in the 
other.’ (Bickerton et al. 2015, page X (2 of manuscript)). Indeed, numerous scholars point to 
a so-called ‘weakening’ of the European Commission (hereafter ‘Commission’). 
Furthermore, Frank Schimmelfennig, in his reply to Bickerton et al., even if he disagrees with 
various aspects of Bickerton et al.’s ‘new intergovernmentalism’, does not hesitate to state 
that the Commission has weakened; become less empowered, when he writes: ‘Even if 
traditional supranational institutions have been weakened – and there is widespread 
consensus that this is true for the Commission – it does not follow that the EU as a whole has 
become more intergovernmental. It is true that governments have been reluctant to empower 
the Commission in the policy areas integrated since Maastricht.’ Schimmelfennig 2015, page 
X (2 of manuscript). 
  
In the European integration literature, the Commission is often portrayed as an organization 
in a state of change, usually forced exogenous change that is resisted and contentious, but is 
increasingly seen as less influential relative to other EU institutions. Various waves of 
imposed reforms forced the Commission to move beyond the technocratic expertise that is 
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the foundation of its authority and status. As such, it is characterized as an increasingly 
politicized organization under siege; one that is struggling to maintain its eroded political and 
administrative influence (Cini, 1996; Nugent, 2001; Dimitrakopolos, 2004; Wille, 2013; 
Kassim, et al., 2013). This literature defines executive influence and power primarily in terms 
of the Commission’s functions as agenda setter and policy initiator. In the wake of the euro 
debt crisis, the Barroso-led Commission is said to have been losing influence to institutions 
such as the European Parliament (Hallerberg, Marzinotto, and Wolff, 2012), or the European 
Central Bank (Drudi, Durré, and Mongelli, 2012), as it exhibits a lack of initiative, visibility, 
and policy entrepreneurship (Hodson, 2013; Menz and Smith 2013; Copeland and James, 
2014). The Commission is also suggested to be organizationally unresponsive to the euro 
debt crisis, such that the crisis has had little or no organizational or cultural influence on its 
institutional framework (Cini, 2014). Some scholars assert that these assessments of the 
Commission may be premature (cf. Bauer and Becker (2014a). Smith (2014), Hartlapp and 
Rauh (2013), and Hartlapp, Metz, and Rauh (2013) argue that the Commission’s internal 
processes can increase its policy capacity and enable it to achieve societal goals even under 
challenging circumstances. To evaluate the ability of the Commission to initiate and manage 
change in the face of economic crises the Commission’s capacity to exercise its critical 
administrative function as the “guardian” of EU rules must also be considered (Bauer, 2006; 
Ellinas and Suleiman, 2011; Bauer and Becker, 2014a, 2014b). The present study contributes 
to and is supportive of this latter critique by studying the dynamics of Commission 
bureaucratic capacity building in light of these economic crises. Has the Commission really 
become weaker in the wake of the euro debt crisis, or was it simply not in the driver’s seat 
whilst the response to the crisis was being hammered out? 
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In the wake of the euro debt crisis the European Union (EU) enacted a series of rules aimed 
at strengthening the authority and technical powers of the European Commission (hereafter 
‘Commission’) to conduct budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance of the member states. 
These rules are well-known. Some strengthened the Commission’s statistical and auditing 
powers. The so-called Six-Pack produced the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) 
and enhanced the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), while the Two-Pack firmed up the 
European Semester (hereafter “Semester”) (Buti and Carnot, 2012; Chang, 2013). A good 
deal of analyses has focused on the origins of these new rules, their contribution to the EU’s 
legal framework, their potential influence on member state budgetary behavior, their 
macroeconomic consequences, and their implications for further European economic 
integration (e.g. Salines, Glöckler and Truchlewski, 2012; Gocaj and Meunier, 2013; 
Ioannou, Leblond and Niemann, 2015; Niemann and Ioannou, 2015; Verdun 2015). What is 
generally missing from these studies is an appreciation for how these new rules resulted in 
the Commission initiating and implementing substantial internal administrative change to 
accommodate the demands of these new procedures. Adopting a principal-agent framework 
this paper seeks to explain how the Commission increased its influence in the surveillance 
process. 
 
The empirical problem begins with the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP requirements that 
stipulate that the Commission monitor member states’ fiscal activities and initiate sanctions 
against excessive budgetary deficits and public debt. The Commission’s well-known failure 
to identify Greece’s budgetary evasions enabled that member state to gain entry into 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and escape the Pact’s sanctions (Savage, 2006; 
Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). Furthermore, the revelation of Greece’s non-compliance proved 
to be a factor that contributed to the onset of the euro debt crisis (Angeloni, Merler, and 
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Wolff, 2012; Zahariadis, 2013). The extent of member states’ noncompliance with EU rules 
resulted in the addition of more rules, which addressed the broad budgetary and economic 
responsibilities of the member states and the specific administrative capacities of the 
Commission in the surveillance process.   
 
This research offers the perspective that in the case of the highly visible and potentially 
politically dangerous surveillance process, the Commission bureaucracy responded rather 
rapidly and effectively to the events surrounding the Greek and the euro debt crises. These 
crises provoked major EU rule changes that required the strengthening of the Commission’s 
administrative authority and technical capacities, while also producing internal coordination 
challenges for the Commission to overcome. The Commission adjusted its internal 
operations, modified the formal organizational structure of some of its Directorates-General 
(DG), reallocated its personnel and hired new staff. These organizational reforms contributed 
to a deeper understanding on the part of the Commission of the economic life of the member 
states, and thus helped promote EU economic integration (Verdun and Tovias, 2013). 
Institutional change, in other words, can occur within the Commission in a far less contested 
manner than some of this literature suggests.  
 
We adopt a principal-agent approach to explain the changes within the Commission. A 
defining characteristic of the EU is the delegation of authority from the member states acting 
as principals to the Commission acting as an agent. This is the case when the Commission 
serves as the guardian of EU treaties and is engaged in the surveillance task of monitoring the 
member states’ budgetary deficits and debt (Pollack 1997; Majone, 2001; Savage and 
Verdun, 2007). In this context, the Commission as agent is delegated the challenging role of 
monitoring and enforcing the budgetary compliance of the principal member states. The 
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economic crisis highlights the limitations of this surveillance, as the Commission often 
proved unable to monitor and secure the member states’ compliance. In fact, member states 
acted as the P-A literature suggests: they engaged in shirking and other opportunistic 
behavior (Kassim and Menon 2003). This shirking is made possible because the ultimate 
enforcement and rule making authority rests with the member state principals, who also in 
this context of budgetary and economic surveillance have more information than their agents. 
The Commission as agent has responded by advocating in favor of strengthening these rules 
and its administrative capacity to enforce them, to gain added oversight powers and obtain 
more information to ensure greater compliance. This is indeed what occurred during this 
time, as we shall show below. 
 
This study makes important contributions to a deeper understanding of the evolution and 
organizational behavior of the Commission, specifically as it develops its surveillance and 
programmatic procedures in light of the extended economic crisis. The Commission’s efforts 
in this regard is one factor in explaining how the emerging institutional framework of EU 
rules, particularly the Semester, contributes to EU political and economic integration.  
 
 
2. CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This research focuses on the five Directorates-General (DG) that are now engaged in the 
surveillance process. Two of these DGs, Eurostat and DG Economic and Financial Affairs 
(DG ECFIN), are long-standing surveillance participants, while DG Employment and DG 
Taxation are new to the process. A fifth DG, the Secretariat-General is also a veteran 
participant, but its responsibilities have been transformed due to the changing EU 
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surveillance rules. We examine below how the Greek crises resulted in the strengthening of 
Eurostat’s administrative authority and capacities. We also analyze how the crisis produced 
new rules, especially the MIP and the Semester, which also changed and enhanced the roles 
of the other four DGs in the surveillance process. The additional rules required greater 
participation in the process by these other DGs, but they also produced additional demands 
for horizontal and vertical coordination within and between the DGs. 
 
To conduct this research, interviews were carried out with eighteen key Commission staff, 
including Eurostat’s director-general and each of the five DG’s surveillance coordinating unit 
leaders and their staff. Interviews, as noted, were conducted beginning in 2010 and continued 
through 2014. Follow-up interviews were conducted as needed, as the DG’s surveillance 
duties changed and expanded after the Greek and financial crises. Interviewees frequently 
requested and were assured anonymity to encourage candor in their remarks, especially in 
response to questions regarding such bureaucratically sensitive topics as organizational 
leadership, staffing, EU and Commission resource allocation, and relations within and among 
the Commission’s DGs.         
 
 
3. THE COMMISSION: DG EUROSTAT (DG ESTAT) AND THE REACTION TO 
THE GREEK CRISES 
 
3a. EUROSTAT AND THE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE 
Eurostat’s significant role in dealing with the financial and economic crisis stems from the 
EU’s budgetary surveillance requirements created in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, and subsequent 
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regulatory legislation. Article 126 TFEU/Article 104, Treaty on the European Union, TEU, 
declared that member states shall avoid excessive general government deficits of 3 percent of 
GDP and gross national debt levels of 60 percent of GDP. The Protocol further defined what 
constitutes an excessive deficit, and it established a budgetary surveillance procedure 
requiring member states to submit biannual budgetary and economic data to the Commission 
for review. The Protocol stated that these data on “planned” or “actual” deficits and debt 
would be harmonized in terms of the national accounts framework outlined in European 
System of Accounts (ESA). Eurostat came to prominence in the surveillance process as the 
creator, administrator, and most technically competent interpreter of the ESA. Through its 
technical rulings on national accounts statistical case law Eurostat determined, for example, 
whether a budgetary or economic transaction added to or reduced the size of a government’s 
deficit and debt. These rulings, made in consultation with the member states’ national 
statistics institutes and central banks, proved to be pivotal in the decision to admit several 
member states into EMU, especially Italy, France, and Spain. Eurostat was the DG within the 
Commission that in 1998 finally certified the size of a member state’s deficit and debt that 
affirmed the basis for EMU membership (Savage, 2001, 2005; Schelkle, 2009). Eurostat 
exercises similar authority in the administration of the SGP, as its certification that a member 
state’s “actual” deficits violated the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) is necessary before 
financial sanctions may be imposed on a member state. 
 
Eurostat reorganized its organizational structure and augmented its personnel to fulfill its 
surveillance responsibilities. Prior to the creation of the TEU in 1992, neither Eurostat nor 
any member state, for that matter, employed ESA to harmonize budgetary data. Eurostat’s 
director established a new directorate, Directorate B, Economic Statistics and Economic and 
Monetary Convergence, to gather and harmonize all of data required by TEU. Within the 
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directorate, B-4 managed public accounts statistics for the excessive deficit procedure, which 
entailed collecting the member states’ biannual reports, and certifying their deficit and debt 
status. Despite this responsibility, B-4 never received more than twelve to fifteen staff, many 
of them seconded on from member states statistical offices. Eurostat’s limited staffing meant 
that it lacked personnel literate in all of the member states’ languages.  
 
This staffing arrangement reflected the understanding that the surveillance of member state 
budgets during the critical years of the Stage II convergence process operated on the basis of 
trust. This meant that Eurostat accepted their budgetary data as accurate, credible, and 
reliable. The TEU pointed to this limited surveillance authority in Article 104(2), declaring 
that “the Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary situation….in the 
Member States with a view to identifying gross errors.” Consequently, not every budgetary 
transaction required review, but only the “gross errors.” The technical questions therefore 
addressed by Eurostat were whether these data were properly translated into national 
accounts in a manner consistent with ESA, not whether a government’s ledgers were 
internally consistent and valid. Eurostat lacked the formal authority to audit a member state’s 
budgetary accounts, in the manner that the European Court of Auditors might assess the use 
of EU cohesion and competitiveness funds allocated to a member state. Eurostat’s 
surveillance powers and its constrained administrative capacity limited B-4 to the 
examination of biannual reports and annual visits to member states to identify gross errors in 
the interpretation of national accounts by the member states. 
 
3b. THE GREEK STATISTICAL CRISES, 2004 and 2009  
In May 2004, Eurostat reported that Greece intentionally failed to disclose and properly 
classify the biannual budgetary data it submitted to the Commission (Coronakis, 2013). 
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Eurostat then revised Greece’s 2003 deficit from 1.7 percent of GDP to 3.2 percent, a level 
that activated the EDP. Further analysis revealed the Greek government misrepresented its 
1998 deficit, claiming it stood at 1.8 percent of GDP rather than the revised figure of 3.4 
percent. Greek officials acknowledged they underreported defense spending by €8.7 billion 
between 1997 and 2003 (Daley, 2014). Greece obtained its membership in EMU in 2000 
through an active effort in statistical duplicity dating back to at least 1996 (Eurostat, 2004). 
 
The Commission offered three proposals to address this failure in the surveillance procedure. 
First, in March 2005 the Commission recommended amending Council Regulation 3605/93 
to grant Eurostat auditing authority and to expand its member state visitations rights to 
include “in-depth monitoring.” Second, Eurostat would receive additional staff and budgetary 
resources. Third, the member states’ statistical offices would gain greater administrative and 
political independence through a Code of Best Practices. Despite the Code, the member states 
rejected giving Eurostat auditing power and no additional personnel were allocated to the 
agency to conduct budgetary surveillance. As Walter Radermacher, Eurostat’s DG, recalled, 
“In 2004-5, the Commission and Eurostat asked to have audit-like powers. This was the point 
of no acceptance by the member states. So the enhanced powers for Eurostat in 2005 were 
limited to statistical processes. As we have seen in the Greek case in 2009, this created a 
loophole where the last Greek government could cook the books and massage the figures.”1  
 
The member states tolerated Greek statistical misbehavior in 2004 because the solution to the 
problem posed by the Commission challenged their autonomy. Also, the transgression could 
be overlooked during a period of relative economic growth. The economic consequences 
stemming from the next Greek crisis proved to be more perilous, when the escalating free-
rider spillover problem drove the member states to grant the Commission enhanced 
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surveillance authority. On October 2 and 21, 2009, Greek statistical authorities submitted two 
different sets of EDP data to Eurostat, with the second set of revised data indicating the 1998 
deficit to be 7.7 percent of GDP, versus 5.0 percent, and the planned deficit for 2009 at 12.5 
percent rather than 3.7 percent. These revisions contributed to fears that Greece would be 
unable to manage and eventually refinance its national debt.  
 
3c. STRENGTHENING EUROSTAT 
As a result of the Greek statistical crises the Council of Ministers of Economic and Financial 
Affairs (ECOFIN) strengthened Eurostat’s surveillance authority. New EU directives and 
regulations reinforced Eurostat’s role as ESA’s arbiter, while additional staff were provided 
to conduct surveillance. Where Eurostat found itself restricted to ten site visits to Greece 
between 2004 and 2009, the revised regulations called for a regular access through 
“dialogue” and “methodological” visits. In 2010, through Council Regulation 479/2009, 
ECOFIN granted Eurostat auditing power, while Commission Decision 2012/504/EU 
declared Eurostat to be responsible for setting the standards for EU statistics (European 
Commission, 2012).  ECOFIN, however, rejected Commission proposals requiring that 
member states penalize their civil servants if they misreported data, viewing such sanctions 
as an infringement on member states’ sovereignty.  
 
In 2010, the Commission committed itself to tripling the size of Eurostat’s surveillance team 
of fifteen to forty-five, bringing the total staff to some 850 personnel. As shown in Table 1, 
this increase in staffing occurred even as Eurostat’s operational budget fell from € 64.6 
million in 2011 to € 53.4 million in 2012 and with the overall EU budget for administration 
remaining relatively constant in response to member state demands for greater austerity 
(Kaiser and Prange-Gstohl, 2012; Waterfield, 2012).  
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        (TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
 
Eurostat needed this augmentation, as a senior official candidly observed in 2010, “Even 
now, there are people still working on countries who do not have the language…This means 
a whole lot of potential sources of information are lost, ministry of finance documents and 
such that are not translated.”2 By 2014, Eurostat’s hired more than fifty staff for the 
surveillance procedure, even though the DG as a whole lost personnel. Eurostat reorganized 
its organizational structure to accommodate these personnel, as shown in Eurostat’s 
organization chart.3 The surveillance section grew from one unit of fifteen persons in B-4 to 
three units, two units of which consist of national accounts specialist, D-2 and D-3 
respectively covering fifteen and thirteen member states, with a third unit, D-4, staffed by 
personal by auditors and accountants.  
    
Finally, in October 2011, Commission President Barroso promoted Economic and Monetary 
Affairs Commissioner Ollie Rehn to Commission vice president, strengthening his authority, 
while transferring Eurostat from his portfolio to that of Commissioner Semeta’s Taxation, 
Customs, Audit and Anti-Fraud portfolio. This transfer enabled Rehn to focus on the euro 
area’s economic issues while bringing Eurostat closer into alignment with the Commission’s 
other investigatory DG, thus signaling Eurostat’s reinforced surveillance powers (Brand, 
2011). Under this reorganization, Eurostat oversees the statistical data used in the evaluation 
of the eleven indicators used in the MIP to assess the member states’ economic condition.  
 
3d. THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER AND NEW DEMANDS ON THE COMMISSION  
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The creation of the Semester placed new and extensive demands on the Commission. Where 
the responsibility for budgetary surveillance under the TFEU and SGP principally fell on DG 
ECFIN and Eurostat, the Semester necessitated bringing new DGs into the surveillance 
process. Where the TFEU and SGP were largely silent on what constituted acceptable 
member state fiscal and economic policies, the MIP called for an analysis of each of the 
member states’ economies, while the Semester called for the member states to present their 
budget proposals to the Commission for review and make policy recommendations before 
they went before their parliaments for adoption. These new rules required a rigorous 
understanding of the member states’ budgetary and economic activities. The Semester 
produced another significant outcome in that its six-month timetable changed the calendar by 
which the Commission, as well as the member states, conducted their surveillance. As shown 
in the following sections, these new rules produced significant changes in the Commission’s 
administrative practices.   
 
4a. COORDINATION BY THE CENTER: DG SECRETARIAT-GENERAL (SG) 
As the Commission president’s direct staff, the primary duties of the 600 members of the 
Secretariat-General (SG) include ensuring the coherence of the Commission’s policy making 
activities and the adoption of these policies by other EU institutions. Although the SG 
certainly played an important role throughout the development of the Euro area, during the 
Barroso presidency and in response to the demands placed on the Commission stemming 
from the MIP and the Semester, the DG had come to take on a horizontal coordinating 
function that has placed it at the center of the Commission’s budgetary convergence and 
surveillance processes (Kassim, et al., 2013).   
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This coordinating task is reflected in four important reforms in administrative behavior. First, 
the MIP and SG bring new DGs into the process whose expertise provides a broader and 
deeper understanding of the member states’ economic activities. These new rules required the 
participation of DG Employment (DG EMPL) and DG Taxation (DG TAU) in the 
surveillance process, in addition to DG Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) and 
Eurostat. As the SG declared, “The European Council underlines that closer coordination of 
economic policies should be focused on policy areas where positive effects on 
competitiveness, employment and the functioning of EMU are most prominent” (General 
Secretariat of the Council, 2013). Second, the SG coordinates a process where each of these 
DGs assesses its respective elements of the member states’ economic affairs. The SG 
provides assessments to other DGs when appropriate and works with them to develop an 
overarching Commission position on a member state’s budgetary and economic status. The 
SG chairs committees of the DGs, where the agenda may include such topics as Europe 2020, 
the Semester, and the economic targets identified in the MIP. Third, the SG manages the 
Semester for the Commission and requires the DGs to adapt to its timetable. SG engages in 
horizontal coordination by ensuring that each of the DGs promptly fulfills its task 
assignments in under the MIP and Semester. The SG also coordinates with DG 
Communications, which received additional staff to monitor how the rules are addressed by 
the press of the member states.  
 
This coordination necessarily at times includes resolving differences in the assessments 
created by the DGs. “The purpose of coordination is to make sure that a common line is to be 
defined and found,” said the official. “The DGs have to look at their angles, but they know at 
the end of the day there has to be a Commission line.”4 The SG is responsible for producing a 
harmonized set of assessments of the member states and recommendations. To fulfill these 
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new responsibilities, the SG assigned its unit D-1, Europe 2020 Competiveness and 
Innovation, the task of coordinating the Commission’s participation in the Semester, as 
shown in SG’s organization chart.5 
     
Fourth, in addition to internal coordination within the EC, the SG’s duties include working 
with the member states to ensure that they comply with the Semester timetable. The timetable 
requires them to provide the Commission with budgetary, macroeconomic, and economic 
sector information in April, with the Commission submitting its member state 
recommendations to ECOFIN in late May. This necessitates engagement with the ministries, 
but, more important, Commission contact with the member states’ political leadership. As an 
SG official explained,  
 What is new is that we have real prime ministerial attention...From here, we are 
 working with whomever is in charge in the member states. One reason is the increased 
 political relevance of the coordination process….The excessive deficit targets 
 are relatively straightforward, but advising member states what to do about the 
 development of real estate prices, their pension systems, or their unemployment 
 benefits requires a completely different kind of knowledge.6  
In other words, the Semester may lead to policy implications that are far more politically 
sensitive than even those generated by the SGP and the EDP. Consequently, the Commission 
President must be directly involved in the new surveillance process, which requires the 
attention of the SG.  
 
4b. HORIZONTAL COORDINATION AND SURVEILLANCE: DG ECONOMIC 
AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS (DG ECFIN) 
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DG ECFIN serves as the Commission’s preeminent DG responsible for the drafting, 
oversight, and enforcement of EMU’s budgetary surveillance rules. ECFIN’s presence is felt 
through its issuance of Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), its economic forecasting, 
and the drafting of warnings and recommendations to the member states in concert with the 
EDP. Although ECFIN was in the best position to accommodate the administrative demands 
created by the MIP and Semester, adjustments still had to be made to strengthen coordination 
internally and with other DGs, meet the Semester’s timetable, and increase the number of 
personnel to meet new work load requirements. 
 
ECFIN had long experience focusing its task assignments on specific member states to assess 
their budgetary compliance. Since the 1990s, ECFIN organized its surveillance activities 
around member state country desk teams. The EU’s expansion required a growing number of 
experts that rapidly expanded due to the euro debt crisis and the imposition of new 
monitoring regulations. As shown in ECFIN’s organization chart, the DG’s directorates F, G, 
and H contain ten unit country desks.7 In 2010, the DG created DDG1, “Coordination of 
Country-Specific Policy Surveillance,” to ensure the horizontal coordination of these desks 
across directorates (DG ECFIN, 2013). DDG1’s functions include ensuring that each of the 
member states is treated equitably in the separate analyses conducted by the various country 
desks, and that there is homogeneity in the DG’s reports submitted to the SG.  
 
ECFIN accelerated its hiring in the mid-2000s due to the EU’s expansion and especially in 
response to the financial crisis. Extending its expertise beyond its traditional focus on 
member state budgets and macroeconomic conditions, ECIN established a new directorate, L, 
which addressed financial matters within the EU. ECFIN also strengthened its other 
directorates, such as B, to mirror the tasks of the other DGs. Said one DDG1 official, “We 
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have the economic angle on the labor market, on the product markets, which covers a lot of 
what DG Enterprise, DG Market, and DG Competition do. We have our units B-2, B-3, B-4, 
they mirror to a certain extent the DGs, which means we have the in-house capacity to have a 
position on labor markets issues from an ECFIN perspective.”8 The member state desks also 
received at least 59 additional billets, bringing total ECFIN staffing to approximately 684. 
This influx of new personnel required another adjustment in ECFIN practice, large-scale 
recruiting and then the necessary training of these recruits. Previously, new staff would learn 
on the job of surveillance in their respective units. Yet, ECFIN experienced significant 
difficulty in hiring competent economists, due to the low salaries offered by the EC and the 
increased technical skills required of new staff (Tims, 2011; Mahony, 2012). To compensate, 
the DG initiated extensive training programs for its new personnel, as the Semester continues 
to require accommodations by the Commission. 
 
4c. ADJUSTING TO NEW RESPONSIBLITIES AND PROCEDURES: DG 
EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AND INCLUSION (DG EMPL) AND DG 
TAXATIONS AND CUSTOMS UNION (DG TAXUD) 
The MIP and Semester greatly expanded the scope of the surveillance process beyond 
examining budgetary deficit and debt totals to a broader evaluation of the member states’ 
economic policies. The requirements of the new procedures meant that the Commission 
needed to draw upon the deeper sectorial and policy expertise of DG EMPL and DG 
TAXUD. These two DGs, in addition to ECFIN and the SG, form the core group within the 
Commission managing the Semester.  
 
In one important way, EMPL’s regular tasks conducted by its staff of 583 prepared it well for 
its new duties. To help implement the European Social Fund the DG previously organized 
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itself to include country desks. These desks managed the fund’s allocation to the member 
states, but the Semester raised them to policy units that evaluate the policies of their 
respective member states. Thus, where the member states are often seen as adopting EU 
practices and values through the process of Europeanization, the MIP and Semester are 
producing something of a reverse effect, where the Commission gains a deeper appreciation 
of the politics, policies, and administrative constraints of the member states. The personnel 
assigned to these desks experience greater scrutiny due to the political sensitivity of their 
analyses. A senior DG official noted, “Our DG deals with everything related to employment 
and social policy. The EU competence on pension systems is rather limited, but, in the 
imbalance procedures, it becomes an issue.”9 EMPL evaluates the adequacy of a member 
state’s pension system, while ECFIN evaluates its fiscal sustainability. Their evaluations 
would be incorporated into a single Commission recommendation to ECOFIN.  
 
EMPL strengthened its horizontal coordination while increasing its staff in the key 
directorates. EMPL relies upon directorate C, Europe 2020: Employment Policies, shown in 
EMPL’s organization chart, to manage internal and external coordination with the SG and the 
other key DGs.10 This internal coordination includes networking and bringing together the 
country desks and the policy directorates within the DG. This unit received two or three 
additional personnel to carry out this function, at a time when the DG as a whole lost staff. 
 
The surveillance process produced more internal adjustment for DG TAXUD than the other 
DGs. Traditionally, the 438 staff of TAXUD engages in broad horizontal policy analysis in 
the areas of customs, indirect taxation, and direct taxation. The Semester demanded different 
skills from the DG and required two structural changes, making it similar in organization to 
the other DGs. First, TAXUD needed to create country-specific knowledge and a new 
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approach to analyzing tax issues. The DG established country desks that combine the 
expertise of Directorate C, Indirect Taxation, and Directorate D, Indirect Taxation.11 TAXUD 
also designated the unit D-4 to provide horizontal coordination across directorates and with 
the SG and other DGs, and vertical coordination among the newly established country desks. 
These country desk teams would also participate in the Commission-wide country desk 
meetings chaired by the SG. TAXUD staffed the new country desk units with additional staff 
shifted from other responsibilities within the DG.  
 
4d. DISCUSSION     
The Commission is often characterized as an organization driven to change by exogenous 
forces. Yet, in the case with the Greek and European financial crises, we see that endogenous 
were also at work. ECOFIN and the Commission reacted to the Greek statistics and the 
economic crises by strengthening the EU’s surveillance rules. The four core DGs engaged in 
budgetary and economic surveillance all initiated critical changes in their organizational 
structures and in their staffing. First, the Commission created a system of horizontal 
coordination across and within DGs to manage the Semester’s workload, timetable, and 
political challenges. The SG came to play that coordinating role within the EC, identifying a 
newly designated coordinating unit. Each of the other DGs identified similar units. These 
units liaison with the SG and exercise vertical coordination with member state desks. Second, 
the DGs established or enhanced these member states desks to conduct the detailed analyses 
and evaluations required by the Semester. Vertical coordination is necessary to ensure that 
the member states are treated equally across the desks. These surveillance activities are of 
such political salience that the Commission has allocated scarce personnel to the key 
directorates within these DGs at a time when the EU budgetary constraints have produced 
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reductions in the Commission’s overall staffing. Significant implications stem from these 
changes taking place within the EC. 
 
Most importantly, the Semester’s emphasis on member state analysis and the organizational 
response has produced new professional expectations and training in the Commission. As a 
senior SG official concluded, “We see the beginning of a deep cultural change, which makes 
the Commission more sensitive to the diversity of situations within the member states. That is 
partly crisis related, but it is also related to a new way of working.”12 Although Eurostat and 
DG ECFIN maintained country desks, the attention these DGs gave to the member states 
focused on their budgetary statistics and their compliance with the TFEU’s Stage II 
convergence process and the SGP. The BEPG generated by ECFIN addressed the member 
states’ general economic direction. The MIP and the Semester, however, require a deeper 
political and technical understanding of the member states’ policies, even by ECFIN. 
Describing that DG’s new competence, the SG official responsible for coordinating the 
Semester process noted, “What has fundamentally changed is that ECFIN has traditionally 
had more of an advisory and analytical role. With the crisis and a more comprehensive policy 
coordination [responsibility], they have become much more of a policy development 
DG…and rule implementation organization.”13   
 
Meanwhile, DG EMPL needed to refocus the orientation of its member state desks towards 
policy analysis, and DG TAXUD needed to create them. “This is a positive thing,” reported a 
senior TAXUD official, “It has allowed us to use our country-specific knowledge….With the 
regular country meetings with country teams organized by the Secretary General, we have 
more contact with other services to look at issues that arise in individual member states in 
more detail.”14 According to an official in EMPL, “The professionalization and economic 
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robustness of the DG is stronger. In that sense, there has been a shift from more descriptive 
work to something that has become much more analytical. So you need to know the context, 
you need to know what’s going on, but you also need to be able to assess and to have an 
opinion of what’s happening.”15    
 
The influence of the MIP and Semester has spread beyond the four DGs involved in the 
surveillance process. “What we see in the past two or three years,” said the SG official, “is 
that most DGs have country desks. We always had policy coordination, but what is new is 
that we have strengthened our capacity to look at policy issues on a country-by-country basis, 
basically entering into a country specific dialogue with member states.”16 According to the 
official, the Commission’s deeper engagement with the member states in this one policy area 
since 2011, the first year of the Semester, some twenty-three member states have introduced 
pension reforms (Oksanen, 2013). By seeing and understanding the member states in a new 
way, through their administration and implementation of the EU’s surveillance process, these 
DGs are contributing to European integration. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In response to the Greek and euro debt crises the Commission acted to strengthen its 
budgetary and economic surveillance procedures through the initiation of new rules and the 
building of its organizational capacity to implement these rules. This examination of the 
Commission’s response reveals an institution that is more proactive than what much of the 
literature suggests, such that the Commission is regarded as generally losing influence, 
authority, initiative, and effectiveness. Even at the DG level, this study challenges the view 
that the euro debt crisis has had little effect on the Commission’s institutional framework or 
changes in its institutional culture. Instead, this study finds that in response to the Greek and 
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the euro debt crises, the Commission prioritized its surveillance activities, reorganized its 
institutional arrangements, reallocated scarce budgetary resources and personnel, and layered 
these on to its existing organizational structures and practices. As such this study emphasizes 
that the Commission still has a prominent role to play even if at the height of crisis 
management the member state governments were in the driver’s seat. 
 
In terms of P-A theory, we observed the Commission, acting as the member states’ delegated 
agent, found the member states shirking their responsibilities, an activity made possible 
largely due to the rule making powers and the asymmetric information held by these 
principals. To increase compliance, the Commission sought rule changes, engaged in reforms 
that included internal reorganization, increased budgets, and reallocated staff dedicated to the 
surveillance process. These changes enable the Commission to strengthen its monitoring 
capabilities, while serving to promote horizontal and vertical coordination among and across 
DGs, with other EU institutions, and with the member states.  
 
At the same time, this focus on the member states is reorienting the Commission’s 
administrative culture, changing the professional and analytical demands placed on staff, 
particularly within the new DGs brought into the surveillance procedure. These findings are 
therefore consistent with scholars who assert that the Commission is quite capable of 
initiating policy and organizational change, and carrying on with the monitoring and 
surveillance responsibilities entrusted to it as the guardian of EU treaties (Hartlapp, et al., 
2013; Kassim, et al., 2013, 292; Bauer and Becker, 2014a, 2014b). In terms of explaining 
why these changes occurred a principal-agent analysis offers us insights into why the role of 
the Commission expanded in terms of surveillance and monitoring. Such an analysis explains 
what the member states were doing (shirking) and how this led to enabling the Commission 
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to be more proactive in checking. This mechanism further enhances the integration process 
and thus deepens European integration. 
 
NOTES 
1. Interview with Walter Radermacher, November 23, 2010. 
2. Interview with Eurostat official, November 23, 2010. 
3. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/10186/758154/Organisation-chart-EN.pdf 
4. Interview with DG SG official, April 4, 2013. 
5. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/sg_org_chart_en.pdf 
6. Interview with DG SG official, April 4, 2013. 
7.  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/economy_finance/organisation/ecfin_org_chart_en.pdf 
8. Interview with DG ECFIN official, April 4, 2013. 
9. Interview with DG EMPL official, May 15, 2013. 
10. http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=656 
11. http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/about/structure/organi_en.pdf 
12. Interview with DG SG official, June 24, 2014. 
13. Interview with DG SG official, June 24, 2014. 
14. Interview with DG TAXUD official, May 23, 2013.  
15. Interview with DG EMPL official, June 18, 2013. 
16. Interview with DG SG official, June 24, 2014. 
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Table 1:  
EU BUDGET FOR ADMINISTRATION, 2008-2014 (BILLIONS OF €) 
Year COM CA* Total CA COM % of Total 
2014 €8.4               €142.6                5.9% 
2013 €8.4               €150.9                5.6% 
2012 €8.3               €147.6                5.6% 
2011 €8.2               €142.3                5.8% 
2010 €7.9               €141.1                5.6% 
2009 €7.7               €113.4                6.8% 
2008 €7.3               €115.7                6.3% 
*Appropriations Commitments 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2014/2014_en.cfm 
 
